How does the control architecture of a multiagent system impact the achievable performance guarantees? In this paper we answer the question relative to a class of resource allocation problems, termed multiagent set covering problems.
Introduction
There is no denying the fact that multiagent systems represent the systems of the future, with wide ranging applications in cooperative robotics [1] , resource and task allocation [2] , supply chain management [3] , surveillance [4] , among others. One concrete example is the problem of monitoring the perimeter of a wild fire, where the goal is to deploy a collection of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), each making independent surveillance decisions in response to local information [5] . While technological developments have paved the way for the realization of such futuristic systems, our basic understanding of networked control architectures and of the role of information, has ultimately hindered their realization.
A multiagent system can be characterized by a collection of individual subsystems, each making independent decisions in response to locally available information. At a high level, the design of a networked control architecture entails specifying two key elements:
the information available to each subsystem, attained either through sensing or communication, and a decision-making mechanism that prescribes how each subsystem processes available information to take decisions. The need for distributed decision-making stems from the scale, spacial distribution, and sheer quantity of information associated with such systems which excludes the possibility for centralized decision making. For example, in the problem of monitoring the perimeter of a wild fire, each individual UAV may be required to make surveillance choices using only information regarding its own aerial view of the landscape as well as minimal information regarding the location of neighboring UAVs due to limited communication capabilities. The quality of a networked control architecture is ultimately gauged by several dimensions including the stability and efficacy of the emergent collective behavior, characteristics of the transient behavior, as well as the level of information propagated throughout the system. Two central questions associated with the design process that we seek to address in this paper are as follows:
(i) What are the decision-making rules that optimize the performance of the emergent collective behavior for a given level of information?
(ii) What is the value of information in networked control architectures? That is, how does informational availability translate to attainable performance guarantees for the emergent behavior through the design of appropriate decision-making mechanisms?
For example, how do information limitations to the UAVs impact the quality at which the UAVs can collectively monitor the perimeter of a wild fire? Multiagent surveillance problems highlight several challenges inherent to the design of such networked control architectures [6, 7] . For this class of problems, the goal is to derive local decision-making rules for the individual subsystems (i.e., sensors) ensuring that sensors efficiently allocate themselves over a given mission space without the need for centralized coordination. A common assumption in the existing literature is that each subsystem is endowed with information pertaining to its local environment as well as the surveillance choices of neighboring sensors [6] . Within these confines, researchers have established a wide range of local decision-making rules that ensure the collective behavior will settle at an allocation; however, the performance guarantees associated with this allocation have often been overlooked. Motivated by this omission, recent work in [8] characterizes the best attainable performance guarantees as a function of the underlying informational dependencies for such multi-agent surveillance problems. For systems comprised of n sensor, [8] demonstrates that any decision-making rule that relies solely on local information can at best guarantee that the resulting collective behavior is within
(1/n) of the optimal system behavior. However, if agents are equipped with slightly more information regarding the state of the system, this impossibility result vanishes and one can easily design networked architectures with a limiting behavior that is guaranteed to be within (1/2) of the optimal behavior [8] . The resounding message from the result above is that informational dependencies play a fundamental role in the attainable performance guarantees associated with networked control architectures.
The goal of this paper is to shed further light on the interplay between informational availability and performance guarantees for a class of set covering problems. Covering problems consist of a collection of resources, each with a respective value or worth, and a collection of agents, each capable of covering various subsets of resources. The overarching goal is to establish a networked control architecture that allows agents to reach the optimal allocation through a process where the individual agents adjust their covering choice based on available information. Of specific interest will be identifying how the information available to the individual agents impacts the attainable performance guarantees associated with the underlying architecture.
We approach this problem through a game theoretic lens where we model the individual agents as players in a game and each agent is associated with a local objective function that guides its decision-making process [9] . We treat these local objective functions as our design parameter and focus our analysis on characterizing the performance guarantees associated with the resulting equilibria of the designed game. An equilibrium of a game is an outcome where each agent is satisfied with their choice given the choices of the other agents. We concentrate our analysis on two well-studied performance metrics in the game theoretic literature termed the price of anarchy and price of stability [10, 11] . Informally, the price of anarchy seeks to provide performance guarantees associated with the worst performing equilibrium relative to the optimal allocation. The price of stability, on the other hand, seeks to provide similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best performing equilibrium. The lack of uniqueness of equilibria implies that these bounds are often quite different.
Our first result concentrates on deriving the agent objective functions that optimize the quality of the resulting equilibria when individual agents are only aware of information regarding the resources they can select. For this class of informational dependencies, we
show that there does not exist agent objective functions that simultaneously optimize both the price of anarchy and price of stability. Rather, there is a fundamental trade-off between these two performance measures. In other words, improving the performance of the worst equilibrium necessarily comes at the expense of the performance of the best equilibrium. In Theorem 3, we characterize this fundamental trade-off and identify the agent objective functions that reach this price of anarchy / price of stability frontier. This result is one of the first in the existing literature that demonstrates a fundamental tradeoff between the price of anarchy and price of stability. Whether or not this trade-off is a more fundamental feature of networked architectures is an open and interesting question.
Our second result seeks to address the question of whether providing the agents with additional information, i.e., system-level attributes beyond information relative to the local resources, can permit the design of networked architectures with performance guarantees breaching this frontier. In Theorem 4, we answer this question in the affirmative as we identify a minimal (and easily attainable) piece of system-level information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with performance guarantees beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier provided in Theorem 3. It is important to stress that the specific make-up of this information is not necessarily important; rather, the importance of this result centers on the fact that certain attributes of the system can be exploited in networked architectures if those attributes are propagated to the agents. Minimizing the amount of information that needs to be propagated throughout the system to move beyond the frontier is clearly an important question that warrants future attention.
Model and Performance Metrics
In this section we introduce the multiagent set covering problem and our game theoretic model for the design of local decision-making mechanisms [12] . Further, we define the objectives and performance metrics of interest, as well as provide a review of the relevant literature.
Covering problems
Let R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m } be a finite set of resources where each resource r ∈ R is associated with a value v r ≥ 0 defining its importance. We consider a covering problem where the goal is to allocate a collection of agents N = {1, . . . , n} to resources in R in order to maximize the cumulative value of the covered resources. The set of possible assignments for each agent i ∈ N is given by A i ⊆ R and we express an allocation by the tuple a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A = A 1 × · · · × A n . 2 The total value, or welfare, associated with an allocation a is given by
The goal of the covering problem is to find an optimal allocation, i.e., an allocation a opt ∈ A such that W (a opt ) ≥ W (a) for all a ∈ A. 3 We will often express an allocation a as (a i , a −i ) with the understanding that a −i = (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) denotes the collection of choices of the agents other than agent i.
A game theoretic model
This paper focuses on deriving distributed mechanisms for attaining near optimal solutions to covering problem where the individual agents make independent covering choices in response to local available information. Specifically, in this section we assume that each 2 Many of the forthcoming results hold for the more general multi-selection covering problem where each agent's action set is of the form A i ⊆ 2 R . However, in this paper we present solely the singleton selection problem for a more direct exposition.
3 Approximation algorithms for finding a near optimal solution to such covering problems, or more general submodular optimization problems, have been extensively studied in the literature [13, 14, 15, 16] . The focus of this literature is predominantly on centralized algorithms for finding near optimal allocations. By centralized, we mean a computer program that takes in the full problem specification and outputs an allocation. In contrast, our focus is on distributed solutions where there is no such central authority and each decision-making entity has incomplete information about the system as a whole. agent i has information only regarding the resources that the agent can select, i.e., the resources A i ⊆ R. Rather than directly specifying a decision-making process, here we focus on the design of local agent objective functions that adhere to these informational dependencies and will ultimately be used to guide the agents' selection process. To that end, we consider the framework of distributed welfare games [9] where each agent is associated with a local utility or objective function U i : A i → R and for any allocation a = (a i , a −i ) ∈ A, the utility of agent i is
where |a| r captures the number of agents that choose resource r in the allocation a, i.e.
the cardinality of the set {i ∈ N : a i = r}, and f : N → R defines the fractional benefit awarded to each agent for selecting a given resource in allocation a. 4 We will refer to f as the distribution rule throughout. Note that an agent's utility function in (1) is consistent with the local information available as it only depends on the resource that the agent selected, the number of agents that also selected this resource, as well as the distribution rule f and relevant resource value v r . We will express such a welfare sharing game by the tuple G = {N, R, {A i } i∈N , f, {v r } r∈R } and drop the subscripts on the above sets, e.g., denote {v r } r∈R as simply {v r }, for brevity.
The goal of this paper is to derive the distribution rule f that optimizes the performance of the emergent collective behavior. Here, we focus on the concept of pure Nash equilibrium as a model for this emergent collective behavior [17] . A pure Nash equilibrium, which we will henceforth refer to as just an equilibrium, is defined as an allocation a ne ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N and for all a i ∈ A i , we have
In essence, an equilibrium represents an allocation for which no single agent has a unilateral incentive to alter its covering choice given the choices of the other agents. It is important to highlight that an equilibrium might not exist in a general game G. Nevertheless, when restricting attention to the class of games with utility functions defined in (1), an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist as the resulting game is known to be a congestion game [18] .
The sets N and R denote the sets of natural and real numbers, respectively. 5 There is a rich body of literature that provides distributed decision-making mechanisms that ensures the emergent collective behavior will reach an equilibrium for the class of games considered in this paper [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] . However, we will not discuss such results due to space considerations.
We will measure the efficiency of an equilibrium allocation in a game G through two commonly studied measures, termed price of anarchy and price of stability, defined as follows:
where we use the notation a ne ∈ G to imply an equilibrium of the game G. In words, the price of anarchy characterizes the performance of the worst equilibrium of G relative to the performance of the optimal allocation, while the price of stability focuses on the best equilibrium in the game G. Such distinction is required as equilibria are guaranteed to exists for the class of utilities considered in (1), but in general they are not unique.
Throughout, we require that a system designer commits to a distribution rule without explicit knowledge of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. Note that once a particular distribution rule f has been chosen, this distribution rule defines a game for any realization of the parameters. The objective of the system designer is to provide desirable performance guarantees irrespective of the realization of these parameter, even if they where chosen by an adversary. To that end, let G f denote the family of games induced by a given distribution rule f , i.e., any game G ∈ G f is of the above form. We will measure the quality of a distribution rule f by a worst-case analysis over the set of induced games G f , which is the natural extension of the price of anarchy and price of stability defined above, i.e.,
The price of anarchy PoA(G f ) for a given distribution rule f provides a bound on the quality of any equilibrium irrespective of the agent set N , resource set R, action sets {A i }, and resource valuations {v r }. The price of stability, on the other hand, provides similar performance guarantees when restricting attention to the best equilibrium.
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The goal of this paper is to investigate the design of distribution rules that optimize the metrics introduced in (2) and (3). 6 One motivation for studying the price of stability is the availability of distributed learning rules that lead the collective behavior to the best equilibrium, e.g., [24, 25, 26] .
Related work
The field of utility design has been receiving significant research attention due to applicability to multiagent systems [23, 27, 28] and social influence [29] . Utility design focuses on the design of agent objective functions geared at providing some desired features in the resulting game, e.g., existence of equilibria, efficiency of equilibria, among others. While recent work in [30] has identified all design approaches that ensure equilibrium existence in local utility designs, in general the question of optimizing the efficiency of the resulting equilibria, i.e., optimizing the price of anarchy, is far less understood. Nonetheless, there are a few positive results in this domain worth reviewing. The most notable result is [12] which focuses on the same set covering problem presented in this manuscript. In [12] , the author characterizes the distribution rule f that optimizes the price of anarchy; however, there is no mention of the accompanying price of stability or the uniqueness of the prescribed rule. Further, there is no characterization of the price of anarchy for alternative distribution rules. Different setups where optimizing the price of anarchy has been explored include concave cost sharing games [31] , reverse carpooling games [32] , among others. The bulk of the research regarding optimal utility design has concentrated on a specific class of objectives, termed budget-balanced objectives, which imposes the constraint that the sum of the agents' objectives is equal to the system welfare for every allocation. With regards to the objective functions considered in (1), the only design that satisfies this budget-balanced constraint is
where we use the notation "es" to signify equal share. Within the confines of budget- However, the imposition of this budget-balanced constraint is unwarranted in the context of multiagent system design and its removal allows for improved performance, as shown in [12] and in this manuscript. 8 
An illustrative example
In this section we consider a simple family of covering problems consisting of two agents, N = {1, 2}, and three resources, R = {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, to illustrate the challenges that a system designer faces when designing a distribution rule f without explicit knowledge of the action sets A 1 and A 2 and the resource valuations v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 .
We begin by investigating the efficiency guarantees associated with the unique budgetbalanced distribution rule in (4). Consider one problem instance where In each box of the payoff matrix, the first entry is the payoff to agent 1 and the second entry is the payoff to agent 2. Note that for this instance, there is a unique equilibrium (r 1 , r 1 ) which garners a total welfare of 2. The optimal total welfare is 2.99; hence the price of anarchy and price of stability satisfy PoA(G fes ) ≤ 2/2.99 ≈ 0.67 and PoS(G fes ) ≤ 0.67.
Consider an alternative distribution rule, termed marginal contribution, that is of the
Note that employing the marginal contribution distribution rule for the problem instance drawn above induces a unique equilibrium (r 1 , r 2 ) which is the optimal allocation.
However, consider an alternative problem instance where These case studies suggest that f mc outperforms f es with regards to the price of stability, while f es outperforms f mc with regards to the price of anarchy. However, whether or not these conclusion hold more generally for alternative parameters sets is, at this stage, very much unclear. While specific examples provide upper bounds on the price of stability / price of anarchy, a completely different set of techniques will have to be employed to provide lower bounds on these efficiency measures. Characterizing both the lower and upper bounds associated with these efficiency measures is essential to adequately compare the performance guarantees associated with any two distribution rules.
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Results
In this section we characterize the inherent tension between the price of anarchy and price of stability as design objectives. We begin our analysis by strengthening the results in [12] to attain a tight price of anarchy for any distribution rule f . We then proceed to characterize the achievable price of stability guarantees. We further highlight the implications on the price of stability associated with requiring a desired price of anarchy. Finally, we show how to move beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier given in Theorem 3 if we allow the agents to condition their choice on a higher degree of system-level information. The proofs of the forthcoming theorems will be presented in the Supplementary Materials.
A tight price of anarchy
Recall that G f is the set of set covering games induced by a given distribution rule f .
We now introduce a subset of these games that impose constraints on the maximum number of agents that could select a single resource. More formally, let G k f ⊂ G f , k ≥ 1, denote the family of games where at most k agents can select any single resource, i.e.
We will refer to the games G k f as games with cardinality k.. Our first result strengthens the findings of [12] to obtain a tight price of anarchy for any distribution rule f over each set of games G 
where
Further, the optimal price of anarchy is
and the unique distribution rule that achieves this price of anarchy over the induced games
The importance of Theorem 1 is that it allows us to explicitly compute the price of anarchy for any given distribution rule. This characterization will be crucial in the forthcoming section, where we present the trade-off between price of anarchy and price of stability. Further, this characterization allows us to optimize the price of anarchy over admissible distribution rules f and thus to obtain (9). We will commonly refer to f k gar as Gairing's distribution rule conditioned on instances of cardinality k to reflect its origination in [12] .
A tight price of stability
In this section we turn our attention to the other performance metric of interest, the price of stability. Our goal here parallels our objective in the preceding section as we attempt to derive a tight price of stability for any distribution rule f . The following theorem gives such a characterization.
Theorem 2 Consider any non-increasing distribution rule f and cardinality k ≥ 1. The price of stability associated with the induced family of games G k f is
Further, the optimal price of stability is
and the unique distribution rule that achieves this price of stability over the induced games A trade-off between the anarchy and stability
The previous two subsections highlight how the structure of f impacts both the price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees. In this section we seek to identify the compatibility (or lack thereof) of these two measures of efficiency. That is, how do requirements on the price of anarchy impact the attainable price of stability? The following theorem provides an answer to this question.
Theorem 3
Consider any cardinality k ≥ 1 and desired price of anarchy α satisfying
(i) For any non-increasing distribution rule f , if PoA(G k f ) ≥ α, then the price of stability satisfies
10 The expression of Z k (α) is given in (26) in the Supplementary Materials. where
(ii) The bound in (12) is tight, i.e., max f :
The results of Theorem 3 are illustrated in Figure 2 where we highlight the plausible price of anarchy / price of stability region. In particular, Theorem 3-(i) establishes that there does not exist a distribution rule f that attains a price of stability and price of anarchy in the red region of the figure. Hence, there is an inherent tension between these two measures of efficiency as improving the performance of the worst equilibria necessarily comes at the expense of the best equilibria, and vice versa. The expression of Z k (α) defines this trade-off. The second claim of Theorem 3 guarantees that the bound obtained in (12) is tight, i.e., there are distribution rules that achieve price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees that lie exactly on the boundary of the red region.
Adding Information
The previous section highlights a fundamental tension between the price of stability and price of anarchy for the given covering problem when restricted to local agent objective 
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the red region is also not achievable. That is, there does not exist a distribution rule with joint price of anarchy and price of stability guarantees in the red region. For example, if α ≤ 1/2, then a price of stability of 1 is attainable while meeting this price of anarchy demand. However, if α = 1 − 1/e, then a price of stability of 1 is no longer attainable. In fact, the best attainable price of stability is now also 1 − 1/e. functions of the form (1) . In this section, we challenge the role of locality in these fundamental trade-offs. That is, we show how to move beyond the price of anarchy / price of stability frontier given in Theorem 3 if we allow the agents to condition their choice on a higher degree of system-level information.
With this goal in mind, we introduce a minimal and easily attainable piece of systemlevel information that can permit the realization of decision-making rules with efficiency guarantees beyond this frontier. To that end, for each allocation a ∈ A we define the information flow graph (V, E) where each node of the graph represents an agent and we construct a directed edge i → j if a i ∈ A j for i = j (no self loops). Based on this allocation-dependent graph, we define for each agent i the set N i (a) ⊆ N consisting of all the agents that can reach i through a path in the graph (V, E). Similarly, for each agent i we define
which consists of the union of A i and all the sets of other agents that can reach i through a path in the graph. An example is shown in Figure 3 . Lastly, building upon this graph we define the following two quantities:
x i (a) = max
The term V i (a) captures the highest valued resource in agent i's choice set A i that is not covered by any agent. If the set A i \ a −i is empty, we set V i (a) = 0. Similarly, the term x i (a) captures the highest-valued resource in the enlarged set Q i (a) not currently covered by any other agent. If the set Q i (a) \ a is empty, we set x i (a) = 0. We are now ready to specify the information based game. As before, we have a set of agents N and each agent has an action set A i ⊆ R. Here, we consider a statebased distribution rule that toggles between the two extreme optimal distribution rules:
Gairing's rule and the marginal contribution rule. More formally, the distribution rule for agent i is now of the form
and the corresponding utilities are given by U i (a i = r, a −i ) = v r · f k i (a), as we allow the system-level information x i (a) and V i (a) to prescribe which distribution rule each agent applies. We denote with f k sb = {f k i } i∈N the collection of distribution rules in (16) and informally refer to it as to the state-based distribution rule.
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The next theorem demonstrates how f k sb attains performance guarantees beyond the price of stability / price of anarchy frontier established in Theorem 3. 
We remark on Theorem 4 for the case when k → ∞ for ease of exposition. Note that for this case, a consequence of attaining a price of anarchy of 1−1/e was a price of stability also of 1 − 1/e and this was achieved using Gairing's distribution rule in (9) . Using the state-based rule given in (16), a system designer can achieve the optimal price of anarchy without any consequences for the price of stability. Hence, the identified piece of systemlevel information was crucial for moving beyond the inherited performance limitations by adhering to our notion of local information. Whether alternative forms of system-level information could move us beyond these guarantees, or achieve these guarantees with less information, is an open research question.
Conclusions
How should a system operator design a networked architecture? The answer to this question is non-trivial and involves weighing the advantages and disadvantages associated with different design choices. In this paper we highlight one novel trade-off pertaining to the price of anarchy and price of stability in set covering problems with local information. Further, we demonstrate how a system designer can move beyond these limitations by equipping the agents with additional information about the system. Fully realizing 11 We express the distribution rule as f the potential of multiagent systems requires to pursue a more formal understanding of the inherent limitations and performance trade-offs associated with networked architectures. While this paper focused purely on two performance measures, other metrics of interest include convergence rates, robustness to adversaries, fairness, among others. In each of these settings, it is imperative that a system operator fully understands the role of information within these trade-offs. Only then, will a system operator be able to effectively balance the potential performance gains with the communication costs associated with propagating additional information through the system. 
Supplementary Materials Proof of Theorem 1
The distribution rule maximizing the price of anarchy and the corresponding optimal value of (8) are derived in [12] by means of a different approach. Thus, in the following we only show the tight bound of (6). Proof: For any non increasing distribution rule, [12] proves that the price of anarchy
holds too, which will complete the proof. To do so, note that by definition
Hence, we can distinguish two cases. For each of them we will construct an instance of covering game that achieves PoA(G 
First, suppose f (j) > f (j + 1) and define γ = f (j + 1)/f (j) < 1. Consider the instance given in Figure S1 , where there are j agents at each of the m + 1 levels (m > 0). Each agent is represented by a solid line and the circles at either end of the line indicate the choices available to that agent. In particular, in Level 0 there are j agents and j + 1 resources of which j valued at γ 0 f (j) and a single one valued at γ 0 . At each subsequent level k > 0, there are j agents and j resources of which j − 1 valued at γ k f (j) and a single one valued at γ k . Further, at each level k > 0 one of the agents can choose between the common element at level k or the common at level k − 1. The equilibrium allocation a ne consists of all the agents
Figure S1
: First instance used in case i).
selecting the common resource to their right in Figure S1 . This produces a welfare of W (a
, which in the limit of m → ∞ reduces to
The optimal allocation a opt covers all resources, except one of those valued γ m f (j), yielding a total welfare of W (a
which in the limit of m → ∞ reduces to
from which the desired result follows:
Now, suppose f (j) = f (j + 1). Consider the instance given in Figure S2 , consisting of j agents and j + 1 resources, one of them valued at 1 and j − 1 valued at f (j).
One equilibrium allocation a ne consists of all the agents selecting the resource to their right, producing a welfare of W (a ne ) = 1. On the other hand, the optimum yields W (a opt ) = (j − 1)f (j) + 1 = (jf (j) − f (j + 1) + 1) = χ k f + 1, and hence Figure S2 : Second instance used in case i).
The second instance discussed in the previous case applies here as well, with j = k. This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
The distribution rule maximizing the price of stability and the corresponding optimal value of (11) are trivial to obtain, once the result in (10) is proven. Before proceeding with showing the latter, we observe that we can restrict our attention to games G ∈ G k f where there is an optimal allocation that is disjoint, i.e., there is an optimal allocation a opt such that a 
Throughout the remainder of the proof, we will concentrate on games that possess an optimal allocation that is disjoint. We will continue to denote the game set as G We begin by observing that any game G in the class G k f is a congestion game, and thus is a potential game as introduced in [18] , with a potential function φ : A → R of the form
It is well-known that an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist in any potential game [18] , and one such equilibrium is the allocation that optimizes the potential function φ, i.e., a ne ∈ arg max a∈A φ(a). Focusing on this specific equilibrium, we consider a sequence of allocations taking the form a 0 = a ne and a k = (a Claim 2 Define Q = ∪ i∈I a
Proof: We begin with two observations on the above sequence of allocations: (a) the sequence of allocations can continue at most n steps due to the disjointness of a opt and (b) if the sequence continues, it must be that for player i(k+1) a
Accordingly, we have that
The first and third equalities follow by rearranging the terms. The second equality can be shown using the definition of φ as in (17); the last equality follows by (19) . The inequality derives from the fact that a 0 = a ne optimizes the potential function. Thanks to observation (b), one can show that
If Q \Q = ∅, it must be that a 
When Q \Q = ∅, alsoQ \ Q = ∅ and thus the previous inequality still holds. Rearranging the terms and adding r∈Q∩Q v r f (|a ne | r ) to each side gives us
Finally note that
which together with (21) completes the proof.
Our second claim shows that there exist a collection of disjoint sequences that covers all players in N . We will express a sequence merely by the deviating player set I with the understanding that this set uniquely determines the sequence of allocations.
Claim 3 There exists a collection of deviating players I 1 , . . . , I p chosen according the process described above such that ∪ k I k = N and I j ∩ I k = ∅ for any j = k.
Proof: Suppose I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I k represent the first k sequences of deviating players. Further assume that they are all disjoint. Choose some player i ∈ N \ ∪ k I k to start the (k + 1)-th sequence. If no such player exists, we are done. Otherwise, construct the sequence according to the process depicted above. If the sequence terminates without selecting a player in ∪ k I k , then repeat this process to generate the (k + 2)-th sequence. Otherwise, let i k+1 (j), j ≥ 2, denote the first player in the (k + 1)-th sequence contained in the set
(for i = j), this player must be contained in the set ∪ k i k (1), i.e., the first player in a previous sequence. Suppose this player is i (1), where ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
If this is the case, replace the -th sequence with {i k+1 (1), . . . , i k+1 (j − 1), I } which is a valid sequence and disjoint from the others. Then repeat the process above to choose the (k + 1)-th sequence. Note that this process can continue at most n-steps and will always result in a collection of disjoint sequences that cover all players in N . This completes the proof.
In the following we complete the proof of Theorem 2, by means of Claims 2 and 3. Proof: We being showing a lower bound on the price of stability. Let I 1 , . . . , I p denote a collection of deviating players that satisfies Claim 3. Further, let Q k andQ k be defined as above for each sequence k = 1, . . . , p. Using the result (18) from Claim 2, we have
where the above equality follows from the fact thatQ i ∩Q j = ∅ for any i = j which is due to the disjointness of a opt . Using the definition of U i (a ne ), we have
Define γ = max j≤n (j − 1)f (j). Working with the above expression we have
which gives us that
which completes the lower bound.
We will now provide an accompanying upper bound on the price of stability. To that end, consider a family of examples parameterized by a coefficient j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. For each j, the game consists of j agents and (j +1)-resources R = {r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r j } where the values of the resources are v r 0 = 1 and v r 1 = · · · = v r j = f (j) − ε where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant, and the action set of each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , j} is A i = {r 0 , r i }. The unique equilibrium is of the form a ne = (r 0 , . . . , r 0 ) as every agent selects resource r 0 and the total welfare is W (a ne ) = 1. The optimal allocation is of the form a opt = (r 0 , r 2 , . . . , r j ) which generates a total welfare of W (a opt ) = 1 + (j − 1)(f (j) − ε). Performing a worst case analysis over ε and j gives
which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3
Observe that χ k f defined in (7) can be equivalently characterized as the solution to the the following optimization problem
This allows us to state the following corollary, which will be useful to prove Theorem 3.
, denote the family of distribution rules that guarantee a price of anarchy of at least α in games with cardinality k ≥ 1, i.e.,
Then, the set F k α is uniquely defined by the set of distribution rules f that satisfy the following k-linear equations,
Finally, let us define
as the best achievable price of stability given that the price of anarchy is guaranteed to exceed α, where α ∈ (0, 1).
We will now state an enriched version of Theorem 3 using the notation just introduced, as this allows for a more precise proof.
Theorem 5 Let k ≥ 1. The function PoS(G k ; α) satisfies the following:
ii) For any α satisfying
and
Thus, the function Z k (α) introduced in Theorem 3 takes the form
Proof: i) Consider the marginal contribution distribution rule f mc , defined in (5). It is straightforward to verify that χ k fmc = 1 and hence f mc ∈ F k α for any α ≤ 1/2. Further, it is well-known that PoS(G k fmc ) = 1, see [23] . This completes the first part of the proof. ii) We shift our attention to the price of stability. From Theorem 2 and (22) we have
The optimization problem in (27) is equivalent to
We find an optimal solution by first solving for the distribution rule that satisfies the k −1 linear inequalities with equality, followed by verifying that the resulting distribution rule is non increasing. Such distribution rule can be computed recursively, and is of the form
Using Theorem 2 on such distribution rule, gives the desired result in (23) .
iii) The final result can be proven as follows: replace α in (24) with the optimal price of anarchy of (8), i.e., set
Thanks to (23) , the price of stability reads as
proving the claim in (25) . Taking the limit k → ∞ in the previous expression, gives the final result.
Proof of Theorem 4 Proof of PoS result
We begin our proof with a lemma that identifies a structure about the state based distribution rule {f
Lemma 1 Let a be any allocation. Then for each agent i ∈ N , one of the following two statements is true.
Informally, this lemma states that for a given allocation a, the state based distribution rule will either evaluate every resource at the marginal contribution distribution or every resource at the Gairing distribution rule for a given agent i.
Proof: Let a be any allocation and i be any agent. Extend the definition of x i (a) in (15) as
and note that x i (a) = max{y i (a), z i (a)}. First observe that for any
We will now prove that an equilibrium exists and the price of stability is 1. In particular, we will show that the optimal allocation a opt is in fact an equilibrium.
Proof: Let a opt be an optimal allocation. We begin by showing that
for all i ∈ N . Suppose this was not the case, and there exists an agent i such that
. This implies that there exists a resource r ∈ Q i (a opt ) \ a opt such that 
, which contradicts the optimality of a opt . This means that every agent will be using the marginal cost distribution rule to evaluate its utility in the allocation a opt .
Now, suppose a opt is not an equilibrium for sake of contradiction. This means, that there exists an agent i with an action a i ∈ A such that U i (a i , a
Since agents are using the marginal contribution distribution rule, which follows from
which contradicts the optimality of a opt . This completes the proof.
Informal discussion and proof of PoA result
Consider a game G = (N, R, {A i }, {f k i }, {v r }) with cardinality bounded by k. Let a ne be any equilibrium of the game G. A crucial part of the forthcoming analysis will center on a new game G derived from the original game G and the equilibrium a ne , i.e.,
This new game G possesses the identical player set, resource set, and valuations of the resources as the game G. The difference between the games are (i) the action sets and (ii) the new game G employs the Gairing distribution rule, f k gar , as opposed to the state-based distribution rule f k sb . Informally, the proof proceeds in the following two steps: -Step 1: We prove that the equilibrium a ne of G is also an equilibrium of G . Since the player set, resource set, and valuations of the resources are unchanged we have that
where we write the notation W (a ne ; G ) to mean the welfare accrued at the allocation a ne in the game G .
-Step 2:
We show that the optimal allocation a opt in the new game G is at least as good as the optimal allocation in the original game G , i.e.,
Combining the results from Step 1 and Step 2 give us
where the last inequality follows from Theorem 1 since G employs f k gar .
Construction of game G :
We will now provide the construction of the new game G from the game G and the equilibrium a ne . We begin with some notation that we will use to construct the new agents' action sets in the game G . For each i ∈ N , let r i = a ne i and define
to be the set of resources that will give a strictly better payoff to agent i if the agent was
as the set of agents that would move from the equilibrium a ne if they were to use f k gar instead of f k sb . Finally, for each agent i ∈ I, let
i.e. the enlarged set of resources of (13) that are not chosen by anyone at equilibrium.
We are now ready to construct the new game G . As noted above, the agent set, resource set, and resource valuations are identical to those in G. The new action set of each agent i in game G is defined as
Lastly, the utility functions of the agents are derived using f k gar . We denote this game G by the tuple G = (N, R, {A i }, f k gar , {v r }).
Formal Proof of Step 1:
Proof: In the first part of the proof, we will establish that the equilibrium allocation a ne of game G is also an equilibrium allocation of game G . By definition of the action sets {A i }, we know that a ne i ∈ A i for all agents i ∈ N . It remains to show that for any agent
where we use the notation U i (a; G ) to denote the utility of agent i for allocation a in the game G .
Based on the above definition of the action sets {A i }, we only need to concentrate our attention on agents i ∈ I with choices a i ∈ B i , as (33) follows immediately in the other cases. Since a ne is an equilibrium of game G, then by Lemma 1 we know that each agent i ∈ I employs the marginal contribution distribution rule everywhere. Accordingly, we
where the first equality follows from the equilibrium conditions coupled with the use of the marginal contribution distribution rule and the inequality follows from the use of the marginal contribution distribution rule and (16).
We will conclude the proof by a case study on the potential values of U i (a 
Formal Proof of Step 2:
We begin with a lemma that highlights a structure associated with the action sets {A i } in the new constructed game G .
Lemma 2
If r ∈ A i \ A i for some agent i ∈ N and resource r ∈ R, then there exists an agent j = i such that a ne j = r and consequently r ∈ A j .
Proof: Suppose r ∈ A i \ A i for some agent i ∈ N and resource r ∈ R. Then, r ∈ H i by definition of the set A i . By Lemma 1, each agent must either be a marginal contribution agent, i.e., uses f mc at all resources, or a Gairing agent, i.e., uses f gar at all resources. Since, i ∈ I and a ne is an equilibrium, agent i must be a marginal contribution agent, i.e., Hence, r / ∈ H i leading to the contradiction. This completes the proof.
We exploit the result of Lemma 2 to prove Step 2. Proof: We conclude the proof by constructing an allocation a ∈ A that satisfies W (a; G ) = W (a opt ; G) where a opt ∈ arg max a∈A W (a; G). We begin with an initial allocation a where for each agent i ∈ N a = a
That is, we assign each agent the agent's optimal allocation choice if it is available to them in the new action set A i . If all agents received their optimal choice, then the proof is complete.
If this is not the case, then there will be a set of uncovered resources U(a) = {r ∈ a opt : |a| r = 0} which we denote by U(a) = {r 1 , . . . , r m }. We will now argue that we can construct a new allocation a that covers one additional resource from the set U(a), i.e., |U(a )| = |U(a)| − 1 and a ⊆ a , where we denote with |U(a)| the cardinality of U(a).
To that end, consider any uncovered resource r 0 ∈ U(a). By definition, there exists an agent i 0 ∈ N such that a Define the allocation a i 0 = r 1 , a i 1 = r 0 , and a j = a j for all j = i 0 , i 1 and we are done.
-Case 3: Suppose a i 1 = r 1 and |a ne | r 1 > 0, meaning that there are agents at the resource r 1 in the equilibrium allocation. Select any agent i 2 such that a ne i 2 = r 1 .
(i) If a i 2 = ∅, then consider the allocation a i 1 = r 0 , a i 2 = r 1 and a j = a j for all j = i 1 , i 2 and we are done.
(ii) Otherwise, if a i 2 = r 2 , then let a i 1 = r 0 , a i 2 = r 1 , and repeat Case 2 or Case 3 depending on whether |a ne | r 2 = 0 or |a ne | r 2 > 0. Note that Case 3-(ii) can be repeated at most n iterations until an alternative case that terminates is reached. To see this, note that each time an agent is given a new choice in this process, i.e., a i → a i = a i , the agent's new choice is the agent's equilibrium choice, i.e., a i = a ne i . Therefore, once an agent is assigned a new choice, the agent will never be reassigned in this process.
Starting from a as defined above, the above process results in a new allocation a that satisfies |U(a )| = |U(a)|−1 and a ⊆ a . As with the allocation a, the allocation a satisfies max r |a | r = 1 and a ⊆ a opt . If a = a opt , we are done. Otherwise, we can repeat the process depicted above to generate a new allocation a such that |U(a )| = |U(a )| − 1 as nowhere in the process did we rely on the fact that a i = a opt i . Repeating these arguments recursively provides the result.
